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Risk-sorting and preference for team piece rates 
Agnes Bäkera, Vanessa Mertinsb 
 
Incentive schemes not only influence the effort provision of workers, but might also 
induce sorting. As drivers of self-selection, the literature mainly focuses on measures of 
productivity; however, other variables, such as preferences, beliefs and personality, also 
play a role. With this paper, we contribute to the literature on drivers of self-selection by 
analyzing the role of perceived wage risks as potential influences on the sorting decision. 
To this end, we study a sorting decision between two variable compensation systems, 
where both options carry wage risks. Specifically, we look at sorting between individual 
piece rates and team piece rates. Using experimental data, we find evidence for both risk 
diversification considerations and free-riding concerns (i.e., risk of teaming-up with low-
productive teammates) as drivers of self-selection. However, our data does not support 
the concern of our experimental subjects that others actually reduce their effort when 
working under team compensation, as compared to individual-based compensation. 
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A central finding in the organizational economics literature is that different 
incentive contracts can cause output differences not only with the incentive effects 
but also with the sorting effects (e.g., Curme & Stefanec, 2007; Eriksson & 
Villeval, 2008; Lazear, 2000). Productivity, however, is not the only driver of 
self-selection: individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and personality dimensions 
influence sorting decisions, too. The sorting literature mostly focuses on the 
choice between fixed and variable payment schemes. In these decision situations, 
theoretical predictions and empirical findings rarely differ. For instance, risk-
averse workers are more likely to self-select into fixed rather than variable 
payment schemes (Dohmen & Falk, 2011). Given that fixed payment schemes 
carry no wage risk but variable payment systems do, this finding is not surprising. 
The situation is fundamentally different if we analyze sorting within two variable 
payment schemes because both carry wage risks. Here, the sorting behavior of 
rational agents should depend on their expectations of the agents’ own and others’ 
performance, making predicting outcomes much more difficult. This paper 
focuses on self-selection within variable payment schemes and analyzes the role 
of risks in sorting. 
We analyze sorting between incentive systems where payment is based on 
individual output (here individual piece rates) or team output (here team piece 
rates). These schemes mainly differ regarding (1) whether payoffs depend on 
one’s own performance only (individual piece rate) or also on a co-worker’s 
performance (team piece rate), and (2) whether individuals have the opportunity 
to diversify their own idiosyncratic risk (team piece rate) or not (individual piece 
rate). Thus, payment based on team output carries the risk of low-productive co-
workers and, thus, lower pay (e.g., Cooper, Dyck, & Frohlich, 1992; Holmstrom, 
1982; Kvaløy & Olsen, 2006; McAffee & McMillan, 1991), but allows the team 
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members to diversify their own idiosyncratic risk (Breton, St-Amour, & 
Vencatachellum, 2003; Gaynor & Gertler, 1995), i.e. luck or subjective 
productivity shocks such as mood effects or other psychological aspects of 
motivation or distraction (Dohmen & Falk, 2011). Individual-based pay is 
independent of others’ performance but does not offer a diversification option. 
Taken together, individual payment may be more or less risky, depending on 
expectations about the individual’s own and others’ performance and the 
individual’s own idiosyncratic risk.  
The risk diversification aspect of team-based compensation has rarely been 
discussed in the literature, just as team incentives in general (Bandiera, Barankay, 
& Rasul, 2012). Consequently, we do not know whether individuals consider risk 
diversification when making their sorting decision. We address this research gap 
and analyze whether the perceived risk of low-productive co-workers and/or the 
perceived idiosyncratic risk influence the sorting decision between individual- and 
team-based compensation. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has 
analyzed the potential effects of these two risk aspects in detail. However, some 
studies have shown that potential teammates’ productivity influences sorting 
between individual work and teamwork (e.g., Breton et al., 2003; Hamilton, 
Nickerson, & Owan, 2003). Another strand of the literature examined risk 
diversification in other contexts (e.g., Bramoullé & Kranton, 2007a; Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Li & Suen, 2000). For example, in a theoretical paper, 
Chiang and Mahmud (2008) analyze the optimal size of nations by considering 
which regions are likely to form a coalition given, among other factors, the 
variance in income.  
To tackle the research gap regarding risk-sorting effects, we conduct a real-
effort experiment consisting of nine stages: First, we measure participants’ 
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individual productivity levels by the number of correctly solved arithmetic tasks. 
Then we introduce three treatment conditions characterized by different levels of 
idiosyncratic risk: people are informed that at the end of the work period a given 
number (zero, low or high) will be added to or subtracted from the actual number 
of correct calculations. Then we study the sorting decision between two variable 
payment schemes: payment based on individual output (individual piece rate) or 
team output (team piece rate). In addition, we elicit participants’ risk perceptions 
of getting matched with a low-productive co-worker. Last, we obtain participants’ 
risk and social preferences, and individual characteristics. Our experimental 
design partly resembles that of Sloof and van Praag (2010), who analyze the 
impact of low vs. high noise in performance measurement on the provision of 
effort. We use the same real-effort task and integrate their operationalization of 
noise, i.e., idiosyncratic risk, into a multi-stage experimental design (see Dohmen 
& Falk, 2011 for a similar set-up1).  
By studying the sorting decision between individual- and team-based payments 
rather than between individual work and teamwork, we isolate the wage risk 
aspects from interfering effects such as the social desirability of teamwork, a 
preference for social interaction, or the impact of social ties on decision-making 
(Sonnemans, van Dijk, & van Winden, 2006). In particular, team production is 
unaffected by intra-team spillovers and talent disparity.2 Our setting reflects 
particular real-life situations where economic agents can choose to share 
individual production risks, e.g., individual farmers in a co-op, spouses with joint 
accounts, or waitresses pooling tips.3 
                                                 
1 While we analyze sorting between individual and team piece rates, Dohmen and Falk (2011) look at fixed 
compensation versus different variable payment schemes. 
2 For a different perspective, see Franck and Nüesch (2010), who find talent disparity effects in soccer. 
3 Of course, the diversification of idiosyncratic risks is also the main principle underlying insurance.  
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Our experimental data support a risk diversification effect and an effect of the 
risk of being matched with a low-productive co-worker on sorting between 
individual and team piece rates. Specifically, we find perceived idiosyncratic risk 
relates positively to the likelihood of sorting into team piece rates. Apparently, 
individuals are aware of the existence of risk diversification effects under team 
piece rates, and opt for them whenever the idiosyncratic risk is too high. However, 
counterbalancing this positive effect on the attractiveness of team piece rates, we 
also find a negative effect of the perceived risk of being matched with a low-
productive co-worker. Given that the marginal effect of this latter risk is greater 
and of higher statistical significance than that of idiosyncratic risk, we suggest 
that concerns regarding the productivity of potential co-workers might be stronger 
than risk diversification considerations. We do not observe free-riding tendencies 
for workers who sorted into teams: Although we indeed observe lower average 
productivity under the team-based scheme, this is entirely due to sorting and not 
due to a reduction in effort, the major concern the literature focuses on.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we introduce our concepts of 
idiosyncratic risk and the risk of low-productivity co-workers and derive 
theoretical implications regarding their impact on sorting. In Section 2, we 
describe the experimental design and procedures. In Section 3, we present the 
descriptive and multivariate results. In Section 4, we conclude.  
  
1. Wage risk aspects of individual piece rates and team piece rates 
In most work situations, output is not exclusively determined by effort or 
abilities, but is also subject to some risk in the form of exogenous shocks. These 
shocks can be common, i.e., they affect the output of all workers equally, or 
idiosyncratic, i.e., each worker’s output is changed by an individual productivity 
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shock. A typical example of a common shock is fluctuation in demand for the 
good to be produced. Examples of idiosyncratic risks are one’s state of health 
with, e.g., a cold that reduces one’s productivity, or (bad) luck. 
In the literature, output is often modeled as the sum of worker ability and/or 
effort, idiosyncratic risk, and common risk (e.g., Breton et al., 2003; Dohmen & 
Falk, 2011; McAffee & McMillan, 1991; Sloof & van Praag, 2010). We follow 
this approach by defining individual output xi as:  
xi=πi(ai,ei)+εi, 
with πi as the productivity of individual i, which is a function of individual 
ability ai and individual effort ei, and εi as the individual idiosyncratic risk term. 
This idiosyncratic risk is assumed to have the distribution function F with E[ε] = 0 
and variance σ2. We do not include a common risk term in our output function 
because the impact on the wage risk is exactly the same under individual and team 
piece rates and thus should not influence the sorting decision. Given this 
definition of individual output, we define team output as the sum of the team 
members’ individual outputs xi (see also Breton et al., 2003; Königstein & 
Ruchala, 2007; McAffee & McMillan, 1991). 
The output risk translates into a wage risk whenever performance-based pay is 
given (see Dohmen & Falk, 2011). In our case, we analyze sorting between 
individual piece rates and team piece rates, two performance-based pay systems. 
Although individual piece rates entail a variable payment per individually 
produced output unit, team piece rates are paid per output unit produced by any 
team member. For our setup, where team output is the sum of the team members’ 
individual outputs, the assumption that every team member receives an equal 
share of the variable team-based pay seems justified. Thus, we have the following 
wage functions:  
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Individual wage under the individual piece rate system: Yid=β ∙ xi, (1) 
individual wage under the team piece rate system:  
n
k k
t
i x
n
Y
1
1
 , 
(2) 
with β as the variable pay component, n as the number of team members, and k 
as the index for the team members including the considered individual i.4 
Rationality suggests that employees choose the pay system that maximizes 
their utility. In our setup, an employee’s utility is determined by wage Yi, effort 
costs c(ei) and risk preference, where an increase in wage results in higher utility 
while an increase in effort costs (caused by higher effort) results in lower utility. 
For a given form of the utility function, which implies a certain risk preference, 
utility depends only on wage and effort costs. Given that effort and thus costs are 
deterministic (i.e., contain no risk), we can base our analysis of the relation 
between risks and the sorting decision on the wage functions, which enter the 
utility function.  
Regarding risk preference, the economic literature generally assumes that 
employees are risk-averse (e.g., Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007). Given risk-
aversion, utility-maximizing employees should choose the alternative with the 
lower risk.5  
To calculate the wage risk in our model, we refer to the commonly applied 
measure of risk, the variance.6 The variance of the individual piece rate (1) for 
individual i (who knows his or her own productivity 𝜋𝑖) is given by:  
                                                 
4 To simplify our analysis, we abstract from a fixed compensation component in the wage function. A fixed 
component of the same size for the individual and team piece rates would not affect the sorting decision.  
5 For risk-loving agents, the opposite holds true: they should choose the alternative with the highest risk.  
6 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that theoretically the variance is not the best measure of 
increasing risk (see Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970) and that  mean-variance analysis, which we basically apply 
here, is consistent with expected utility maximization only under rather specific assumptions (see e.g. Baron, 
1979). While we share these concerns in general, in this specific case we feel justified in applying the simpler 
reduced form approach because we can show that it is consistent with maximization of expected utility when 
assuming a common CARA utility function. The corresponding math is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖
𝑑) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽 ∙ (𝜋𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑒𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖)) = 𝛽
2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) =  𝛽
2 ∙ 𝜎2 . (3) 
Clearly the only wage risk under individual piece rates is the idiosyncratic risk 
𝜎2. All other parts of the wage function (1) are known to employee i and thus 
deterministic.  
Assuming that idiosyncratic risk terms 𝜀𝑘 are iid and are independent from 
productivity 𝜋𝑘 of potential co-workers, the variance of the team piece rate (2) for 
the individual i is:  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑌𝑖
𝑡) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (
𝛽
𝑛
∙ (𝜋𝑖(𝑎𝑖 , 𝑒𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖 + ∑(𝜋𝑘(𝑎𝑘, 𝑒𝑘) + 𝜀𝑘)
𝑛−1
𝑘=1
))
=
𝛽2
𝑛2
(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) + (𝑛 − 1)(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑘)))
=
𝛽2
𝑛2
(𝑛 ∙ 𝜎2 + (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘))
=
 𝛽2
𝑛
∙ 𝜎2 +
𝛽2 ∙ (𝑛 − 1)
𝑛2
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
This shows that under the team piece rate system, the inherent wage risk is 
affected not only by the idiosyncratic risk aspect 𝜎2 but also by the variance in 
productivity of potential co-workers 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘). The higher this variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘), 
the higher the expected difference between an individual’s own productivity and 
that of the individual’s team members. Given the concavity of the utility function 
of a risk-averse individual and the implied decreasing marginal returns, downward 
deviations from one’s own productivity are weighted much more heavily than 
upward deviations. This is why the meaning of the variance 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘) for decision 
makers lies mainly in being matched with someone of lower productivity. The 
higher the downward deviation from an individual’s own productivity, the lower 
the team output, which results in a lower payoff compared to being paid based 
solely on one’s own output. This risk aspect, inherent in all team-based 
9 
 
compensation schemes, has received much attention in the literature as causal for 
a low preference for teamwork among highly productive employees (e.g., Breton 
et al., 2003).7  
 Although this additional risk 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜋𝑘) should induce risk-averse employees to 
sort into the individual piece rate scheme, team piece rates might also be more 
attractive to risk-averse employees because the rates allow for the diversification 
of idiosyncratic risks 𝜎2  (e.g., Bramoullé & Kranton, 2007b). The idea of risk 
diversification is that a portfolio of uncorrelated risky assets is subject to less 
variation than an arbitrary risky asset. In the context of our sorting decision, team 
output is subject to less variation due to exogenous shocks than individual output. 
The intuition for this result is that on a team, the negative idiosyncratic shock of 
one team member might be compensated for by the positive idiosyncratic shock of 
another team member. Consequently, although a higher idiosyncratic risk 
𝜎2 translates directly into a riskier wage under the individual piece rate system, 
risk diversification under the team piece rate scheme—as modeled by division by 
n (see equation 4 compared to equation 3)—can suppress the effect of an increase 
in idiosyncratic risk. This option of diversifying idiosyncratic risk should 
therefore render team piece rates more attractive from a risk perspective. 
Thus, we consider two opposite risk aspects that determine the risk associated 
with team-based pay compared with individual piece rates: On the one hand, the 
total risk under a team piece rate could be perceived as higher because an 
individual’s wage depends not only on the individual’s own productivity but also 
on unknown co-workers’ abilities and efforts. On the other hand, team piece rates 
                                                 
7 Of course the individual with the lowest possible productivity does not need to fear being matched with 
someone of even lower productivity. However, the sorting behavior of the least productive individual is still 
driven by this risk aspect if the individual is not aware that he or she is the least productive. 
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allow for diversification of idiosyncratic wage risks so that the perceived wage 
risk could be lower for team piece rates. 
As the individual perceptions of these two risk aspects may be relevant for the 
sorting decision, we pose the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, the higher the perceived risk regarding co-workers’ 
productivity, the less likely a risk-averse individual will sort into the team 
piece rate scheme instead of the individual piece rate scheme.  
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the higher the perceived idiosyncratic risk, the more likely 
a risk-averse individual will sort into the team piece rate scheme instead of 
the individual piece rate scheme.  
 
Given that these two aspects are opposed, the more attractive alternative from a 
risk perspective depends on the relation of these two risk aspects, or more 
specifically, their effects. However, it is not clear whether both risk-sorting effects 
can be found empirically and if so, whether one effect dominates the other.  
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
The question of whether both risk aspects influence individual behavior is 
difficult to investigate in the field due to a lack of data. To study factors that drive 
people’s sorting decision between individual- and team-based piece rates, the 
payment schemes must differ only in terms of monetary incentives. In particular, 
we have to rule out that non-monetary incentives reflecting the intrinsic value of 
teamwork drive the sorting decision. In the field, various incentives (e.g., 
monetary and non-monetary, or implicit and explicit incentives) typically coincide 
and make it difficult to separate clean effects. In addition, idiosyncratic risks are 
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often neither observable nor can they be exogenously varied. Similarly, the 
observability of individual preferences and relative self-assessments is typically 
not given, and individual performance is often not perfectly measurable in the 
field. 
Thus, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment that includes a real-
effort work task of repeatedly adding three two-digit numbers.8 The setting 
provides an experimental environment that resembles real work (Van Dijk, 
Sonnemans, & van Winden, 2001; Ivanova-Stenzel & Kübler, 2011) and allows 
us to observe a sufficient degree of output heterogeneity. Furthermore, by 
permitting participants to alternatively spend their work time performing a leisure 
activity (e.g., reading, listening to music), we explicitly create an opportunity cost 
for working and thus facilitate shirking. Figure 1 shows how the arithmetic 
problems are presented on a computer screen. If participants click the OK button, 
a new problem appears instantly. All participants are shown the same sequence of 
problems. Feedback on the number of (correct) answers is given only at the end of 
the work period.  
Fig. 1 Presentation of the arithmetic problems 
-Insert Figure 1 here - 
 
The experiment consists of nine stages (see Table 1). In stage 1, we measure 
individuals’ productivity by the number of arithmetic problems correctly solved 
within five minutes. Participants are paid a piece rate of 30 points per correct 
answer. In stage 2, we explain the decision task to the participants. They are 
                                                 
8 This task is commonly applied (e.g., Eriksson, Poulsen, & Villeval, 2009, Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007, 
Sloof & van Praag, 2010). Simple arithmetic tasks have previously been described as being easy to explain, 
no particular requirements are needed, and they allow the observation of a sufficient degree of performance 
heterogeneity (Dohmen & Falk, 2011). In addition, arithmetic tasks are seen as a relative good proxy for 
cognitive ability. Strong learning effects during the experiment are not expected. 
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informed that they will solve arithmetic tasks similar to the ones before and that 
they will be given 30 minutes to do the work. Then, participants are told that they 
have a choice between an individual piece rate and a team piece rate as payment 
schemes. If the participants choose the individual piece rate, they are paid 30 
points per correct answer. If the participants choose the team piece rate, they are 
randomly and anonymously matched with another participant who has chosen the 
same payment scheme.9 The team piece rate equals 15 points per calculation that 
team member 1 or 2 solved correctly. That is, we implement an equal sharing rule 
in the team condition. To ensure that the participants have a clear grasp of how 
their productivity and risks and those of other team members translate into team 
output, we use the minimal team size of two. Note that the participants stay on the 
same team until the work period is over and that they will never know with whom 
they have been matched.  
 
- Insert Table 1 about here - 
 
Independent of the outcome of the sorting decision, participants receive an 
additional flat wage of 4050 points to avoid losses. Before the sorting decision, 
participants are informed about the volatility of their work environment. We 
follow Sloof and van Praag (2010) in implementing external shocks, i.e., our 
idiosyncratic risk, via noisy individual performance measurement: When 
calculating a participant’s payoff, the number of correct calculations is not 
registered perfectly. In particular, there is a 50 percent chance that an additional 
number of correct calculations is added to the actual number of correct 
                                                 
9 If an uneven number of participants choose the team piece rate, one participant is matched twice but 
receives payment from only one team.  
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calculations. However, there is also an equal probability that the participant is 
unlucky and the same number is subtracted. As a treatment variation, we 
implement a large shock (+/- 135 calculations), a small shock (+/- 10 
calculations), and a no shock environment. We assume that the size of the shock 
has an impact on the participants’ perceived idiosyncratic risk, which in turn is 
expected to have an impact on the sorting decision. We carefully explain to the 
participants that the chosen contract determines how they are paid for the 
produced output and that their decision is irrevocable. At the end of this stage, the 
actual sorting decision takes place (stage 3). Additionally, we ask participants to 
indicate the strength of their preference for either individual- or team-based pay 
on an 11-point scale ranging from “definitively prefer individual piece rates” to 
“definitively prefer team piece rates.” In doing so, we receive additional 
information on individuals’ sorting preference, making it, for example, possible to 
discriminate between those who are rather indifferent about the two options and 
those who hold a strong preference for either option. 
In stage 4, we elicit the participants’ perception of the riskiness of the situation. 
In both shock treatments, the workers’ wage is partly determined by ability and 
effort and partly by chance. The larger the shock σ (i.e., the number of added or 
subtracted calculations), the higher the individual idiosyncratic risk. However, as 
only the perceived riskiness of a situation can be behaviorally relevant, we ask 
participants to evaluate the degree of control they have over the outcome of the 
forthcoming work situation (Wehrung, Lee, Tse, & Vertinsky, 1989). The 
participants could react on an 8-point scale, ranging from “complete control” (=1) 
to “no control at all” (=8). Furthermore, participants evaluate how they perceive 
the situation regarding the number of registered correctly solved questions ranging 
from “very risky” (=1) to “not risky at all” (=8).  
14 
 
In stage 5, participants estimate their relative performance. We ask “What do 
you think: Which percentage of participants will solve more arithmetic tasks 
correctly than you?” Participants can enter any number between zero and 100. 
Participants are paid 100 points for a correct estimation and 50 points if the 
estimate deviates by less than 10. The relative self-assessment measure is intended 
to catch expectations about an individual’s own and others’ abilities and efforts 
(i.e., shirking behavior). Therefore, the relative self-assessment measure is an 
implicit measure of the risk of being matched with a low-productive co-worker. 
In stage 6, participants solve arithmetic problems for 30 minutes or pursue 
leisure activities.   
After the 30 minutes of work time, the idiosyncratic shock is randomly drawn, 
by rotating a pointer over a white and red disk (Sloof & van Praag, 2010). Each 
color fills half the disk. A random device stops the pointer. If this happens in the 
white area, the participant is lucky and a given number σ is added to the actual 
number of correct calculations. Otherwise a given number σ is subtracted.  
In the remaining three stages, we elicit participants’ preferences and personal 
characteristics as they have previously been shown to matter in comparable 
decision situations (Dohmen & Falk, 2011). Stage 7 measures individuals’ risk 
preferences using a lottery mechanism (Holt & Laury, 2002).10 Participants are 
shown a table with 10 rows and have to choose between a safe lottery and a risky 
lottery for each row. Counting the number of safe choices yields a measurement 
of risk aversion. One row is randomly chosen and paid accordingly. In stage 8, we 
measure participants’ social preferences with the decomposed game technique 
(Griesinger & Livingston, 1973; Liebrand, 1984). Participants choose repeatedly 
                                                 
10 Dave, Eckel, Johnson, and Rojas (2010) argue that this measure is rather complex, which could bias the 
elicited risk preference for participants with low mathematical skills. However, we do not find the implied 
correlation of risk preference and mathematical skills in our data.  
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between two “own-other” payoff combinations, which assign a certain amount of 
(hypothetical) money to the players. The method allows us to distinguish between 
individuals endowed with social preferences (“cooperators”) and other types 
(“individualists”, “competitors”).11  
Stage 9 gathers socio-demographic data on age, nationality, gender, major, and 
number and gender of siblings. Participants also complete a 15-items (German-
language) version (Gerlitz & Schupp, 2005) of the well-established NEO-FFI by 
Costa and McCrae (1989), a personality questionnaire indicating individuals’ five 
main personality dimensions (the so-called Big Five: conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, openness to experience, agreeableness and extroversion).  
The experiment, conducted at the TrEx laboratory at the University of Trier, 
was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007), and participants were recruited 
using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Overall, 82 participants (38 percent males) 
participated in the three treatments. The participants received 3 cent (1000 points 
= €1) per correct calculation, a base salary of €4.05, up to €3.85 in the lottery task 
and a show-up fee of €2.50. On average, participants earned about €16, and 
sessions lasted less than 1.5 hours.  
 
3. Results  
3.1. Sorting decision between individual piece rates and team piece rates 
3.1.1. Descriptives 
About 70 (68) percent of (risk-averse) participants chose the individual piece 
rate. In the following, we try to identify determinants that influence individuals’ 
sorting decisions. First, we consider the perceived risk regarding co-worker 
                                                 
11 We run stages 7 and 8 after the sorting decision and work phase to prevent endowment effects resulting 
from stage 7 and a focus on social considerations (stage 8) from biasing our main constructs. Of course, thus 
we put up with prior stages affecting our measures in stages 7 and 8. 
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productivity. We measure this kind of risk via the estimated percentage of 
participants who will answer fewer questions correctly than the considered 
individual. The perceived risk ranges from 15 to 100 with an average of 67.88. 
Comparing the perceived risk to the actual risk, i.e., the percentage of participants 
who earned fewer points in the first stage, we find that participants overestimate 
the risk by 18.46 percentage points on average. This bias in perceived risk could 
lead some participants to choose the individual piece rate even though they should 
have chosen the team piece rate. 
Second, we test whether participants’ perception of idiosyncratic risk is 
affected by the noise treatments. Perceived idiosyncratic risk is measured via an 
8-point Likert scale, asking for the level of control people feel they have over the 
outcome (8=”no control at all”). We find highly significant treatment effects: the 
average score ranges from 2.48 in the no shock treatment to 4.27 in the low shock 
condition up to 5.00 in the high shock condition. The difference is significant 
(p<.001) using a Kruskal-Wallis test. Thus, we conclude that the noise variation is 
reflected in participants’ perception of individual idiosyncratic risk.    
To verify that the observed differences in perceived idiosyncratic risk stem 
from treatment variation rather than from participants’ heterogeneity, we test for 
potential subject pool effects. Table 2 shows that the three treatment groups do not 
differ significantly regarding productivity, risk and social preferences, personality, 
and basic demographics (age, major and gender) using a Kruskal-Wallis test (all 
p-values >.05).  
- Insert Table 2 about here - 
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3.1.2. Multivariate Results 
To test our hypotheses, we run a logistic regression (with robust standard 
errors) of the sorting decision on our perceived risk measures and controls. Given 
that our theoretical predictions hold only for risk-averse individuals, we run the 
estimation with only the risk-averse12 observations, i.e., 73 percent of our 
participants. We control for the degree of risk aversion to see whether we find the 
strength of the risk preference has an effect on sorting. As ability has been shown 
to influence the sorting decision between individual work and teamwork (e.g., 
Grossman, 2004; Hamilton et al., 2003; Kocher, Strauß, & Sutter, 2006; 
Königstein & Ruchala, 2007), we include our productivity measure (number of 
correctly solved arithmetic problems in stage 1) in the regression. Furthermore, 
we control for social preferences, major (economics or not), and gender.  
Given that our dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 
whenever the team piece rate was chosen, logistic regression is suitable. Table 3 
presents the average marginal effects of the explanatory and control variables on 
the likelihood of choosing the team piece rate system. Given our coding of the 
dependent variable, positive marginal effects demonstrate that an increase in the 
corresponding variable increases the likelihood of sorting into the team piece rate.  
- Insert Table 3 about here - 
 
Supporting hypothesis 1, we find the risk regarding co-workers’ productivity 
has a significant negative effect on the likelihood of sorting into the team piece 
                                                 
12 For risk-loving individuals, the expected effects of our risk variables on the sorting decision should be the 
exact opposite. Risk-neutral individuals should not take risks into account at all. In principle, we could test 
whether the effects are indeed the exact opposite for risk-averse and risk-loving individuals. However, only 
seven of 82 observations are risk-loving and all opted for individual piece rates, so that an estimation of the 
full sample with dummy variables for different risk preferences is not feasible. 
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rate. This result suggests that risk-averse individuals try to avoid the risk of being 
matched with a low-productive co-worker and therefore choose the individual 
piece rate. This direct empirical evidence is in line with common intuition 
suggesting that relatively high-productive workers reject team compensation. In 
accordance with hypothesis 2, Table 3 also shows a significant positive relation 
between perceived idiosyncratic risk and the likelihood of sorting into team piece 
rates. This effect can be explained with the possibility of diversifying one’s own 
idiosyncratic risk when entering the team piece rate scheme.  
To be able to suggest which risk effect is stronger and might overcompensate 
the other, we z-standardized the two risk measures. This allows us to compare the 
size of the average marginal effects of the two risk aspects. Given that the 
coefficient of the risk regarding co-workers’ productivity is larger and of higher 
statistical significance, we suggest that when deciding whether to work under an 
individual piece rate or a team piece rate, concerns regarding the productivity of 
potential co-workers might be stronger than risk diversification considerations. 
In contrast to the existing literature (e.g., Grossman, 2004; Hamilton et al., 
2003; Kocher et al., 2006; Königstein & Ruchala, 2007), we do not find an effect 
of individual productivity on the sorting decision. However, this lack of 
significance is likely due to productivity being indirectly incorporated in our 
measure of the risk of being matched with someone who has lower productivity 
than oneself. Our data support this explanation of the lack of a significant 
productivity effect: If we omit this risk measure from the estimation, productivity 
has a significant and negative effect on the likelihood of sorting into team piece 
rates. Given that the absolute level of productivity is not significant when we 
include a relative measure, it seems that not absolute but relative productivity is 
decisive.  
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Regarding our control variables, we observe no significant effects. Although 
the amount of perceived risk is relevant, the degree of risk aversion has no 
significant effect on the sorting decision.  Similarly, individuals’ willingness to 
cooperate, an economics major, and gender do not have significant impacts on the 
sorting decision.  
 
3.1.3. Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we run the same estimation as in Table 
3 with the full sample, i.e., including the risk-neutral and risk-loving participants 
(see Table 4, column 1). Our results remain qualitatively the same, which was to 
be expected as the majority of individuals are risk-averse.  
- Insert Table 4 about here - 
 
As another robustness check, we apply a different dependent variable in the 
form of the strength of the preference for the chosen compensation scheme. We 
run an OLS estimation with robust standard errors of this quasi-metric variable on 
our explanatory and control variables (column 2). Our results remain qualitatively 
unchanged with the exception of the degree of risk aversion, which is now 
significant and negative at the 10-percent level. This implies that highly risk-
averse participants have a stronger preference for individual piece rate schemes.  
As an alternative to the perceived idiosyncratic risk measure used in Table 3, 
we asked how risky participants judged the situation to be regarding the registered 
number of correctly solved tasks. We find the same qualitative effects of our risk 
variables as before (column 3) and our control variables remain insignificant.  
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Last, we include measures for the Big Five personality traits in our estimation 
because personality has recently been shown to influence sorting decisions 
(Dohmen & Falk, 2011) and could be correlated with risk preference (Borghans, 
Duckworth, Heckman, & ter Weel, 2008). Our results are mainly robust to 
including these additional controls (see column 4); however, our idiosyncratic risk 
measure just misses significance at the 10-percent level. Conscientiousness has a 
significant and negative impact on the likelihood of sorting into team piece rates, 
whereas the other personality traits have no effect.  
 
3.2. Productivity under individual and team piece rates 
When productivity before and after the sorting decision is compared, the 
productivity difference can be due to a) learning or exhaustion or b) changes in 
effort due to a different incentive scheme. Note that there is no change in the 
incentive scheme for participants who sorted into individual piece rates. 
Consequently, differences in productivity are likely caused by learning or 
exhaustion.  
Figure 2 compares average productivity before and after the sorting decision 
for participants who sorted into individual piece rates (the first cluster of three 
bars) and those who opted for team piece rates (the second cluster). The third bar 
of each cluster displays the productivity after the sorting decision normalized to a 
five-minute interval, allowing for level comparison with productivity before the 
sorting decision.  
Fig. 2 Productivity before and after sorting decision 
- Insert Figure 2 about here - 
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Regarding the question of how productivity changes between the two work 
stages, we first look at the first cluster and compare the productivity before sorting 
with the normalized productivity after sorting in the individual piece rate scheme. 
We observe higher (normalized) productivity after (27.84) compared to before the 
sorting decision (24.83). The difference is highly significant (p<.001) using a two-
sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The increased productivity is likely caused by 
learning effects that outpace potential exhaustion effects.  
Working under a team piece rate compared to individual piece rates holds the 
option of free-riding on co-workers’ productivity. If free-riding is an issue, we 
would expect to see a decrease in efforts from the first work stage under 
individual piece rates to the second work stage for individuals who sorted into 
team piece rates (the second cluster). However, when comparing the respective 
productivity figures, we find a productivity increase of about the same magnitude 
as for individual piece rates. In the work stage before the sorting decision, 
participants show average productivity of 18.67 correctly solved arithmetic 
problems. In the second work stage, the normalized average productivity for these 
participants was 21.77. Again, this difference is significant using a two-sided 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test (p=.002). The observations together reinforce the 
conclusion that individuals who opted for team-based compensation did not do so 
to free-ride on others’ performance. As we observe productivity increases of the 
same magnitude under both payment schemes, the incentive scheme is likely to 
have no (strong) effect on productivity differences. Rather, learning effects may 
occur and positively influence participants’ abilities.  
In line with previous findings (e.g., Dohmen & Falk, 2011), Figure 2 shows 
ample evidence of productivity sorting. A comparison of the first bar in both 
clusters reveals that individuals who sorted into individual piece rates were more 
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productive (24.83) than those who opted for the team piece rate (18.67) according 
to the stage 1 productivity indicator. This difference is significant with p=.014 
using a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. Thus, we can conclude that high-
productive workers prefer to get paid based on their own achievements, whereas 
low-productive workers prefer a team piece rate. This is in line with some 
previous findings (e.g., Kocher et al., 2006, but not Hamilton et al., 2003). The 
ex-ante productivity difference (which was due to sorting as shown before) 
continues in the subsequent work phase. A similar statistical difference results 
when looking at the productivity and the normalized productivity in the second 
work phase between participants who sorted into individual and team piece rate 
(p=.022).  
Apart from the chosen incentive system, the treatment in the form of an 
exogenous productivity shock (increasing or decreasing individual output) could 
also influence participants’ effort provision. In an experiment, Sloof and van 
Praag (2010) find that efforts are significantly higher in the high than in the low 
shock environment. Remember that in our experiment, we have three treatments 
with large, small and no productivity shock. Figure 3 shows for each treatment the 
respective average productivity in the second work stage (where we can observe 
the effects of a shock) for individuals who sorted into individual piece rates (the 
first cluster) and those who chose the team piece rate (the second cluster).  
Fig. 3 Productivity after sorting decision depending on treatment 
-Insert Figure 3 about here- 
 
When comparing productivity between treatments and within the chosen 
incentive scheme, the Kruskal-Wallis test (two-sided) demonstrates that 
productivity differs significantly among shock treatments in the individual piece 
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rate scheme (p=.016) but not in the team piece rate scheme (p=.212). A closer 
look at the individual piece rate scheme using Mann-Whitney tests reveals that 
productivity in the large shock treatment is significantly higher than in the small 
shock treatment (p=.005) and the no shock treatment (p=.030). However, the 
difference between the no shock treatment and the small shock treatment is not 
significant (p=.988). 
To verify that the difference between the small and large shock treatment does 
not stem from subject pool effects, we compare productivity indicators between 
treatments. As expected, we find that no significant difference exists (Kruskal-
Wallis test, p=.114), indicating that the observed differences in the 30-minute 
work phase do not result from exogenous productivity differences within the 
treatment groups. Instead, we may conclude that—in line with Sloof and van 
Praag (2010)—a high shock induces high effort. On top of that, we derive the 
following results: First, the effort-enhancing effect of noise is present only in the 
individual piece rate scheme. For team-based pay, we find qualitatively similar 
results, but the difference is not statistically significant. Second, our data show 
that people in our between-subject design exert similar effort levels in the no 
shock condition and the low shock condition under both payment schemes. Thus, 
we conclude that low shock environments are inefficient and completely 
comparable to environments where no shock happens at all. Or, differently 
phrased, the existence of small noise in performance measurement does not 
stimulate effort exertion compared to perfect performance measurement.  
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4. Conclusion 
This paper advances the research on multidimensional sorting by focusing on 
two different variable pay contracts, individual and team piece rates. Earnings 
from both schemes are uncertain and therefore risky, but imply different wage 
risks: Team piece rates carry the risk of being matched with low-productive co-
workers but allow individuals to diversify the own idiosyncratic risk. These 
features are not present under individual piece rates.  
Although there is ample evidence that individuals consider the risk of low-
productive co-workers, the risk diversification aspect has mostly been neglected 
in the literature. Our analysis shows that both risk aspects help explain sorting, but 
considerations concerning the risk of being matched with a low-productive co-
worker seem to be more important than risk diversification considerations. 
Specifically, we find that perceived idiosyncratic risk positively relates to the 
likelihood of sorting into team piece rates. Apparently, individuals are aware of 
the existence of risk diversification effects under team piece rates and opt for them 
whenever the idiosyncratic risk gets too high. However, counterbalancing this 
positive effect on the attractiveness of team piece rates, individuals also consider 
the risk of being matched with a low-productive co-worker when choosing team 
piece rates. We find a significant and negative relation between the estimated 
percentage of potential co-workers with lower productivity than one’s own and 
the likelihood of opting for team piece rates. Given that the marginal effect of this 
latter risk is greater than that of idiosyncratic risk, we tentatively conclude that 
although risk diversification is a driver of risk-sorting decisions, the risk of being 
matched with a low-productive co-worker carries more weight.  
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A potential reason for this finding might be that participants are more willing 
to bear exogenous variations in income due to an act of nature than others’ 
intentional choices. Indeed, research on the effects of causal attributions on 
preferences (Blount, 1995; Charness, 2004) has shown that individuals have a 
need to assign responsibility for why outcomes occur. In particular, there might be 
a tendency to assign blame to co-workers for free-riding, i.e., exerting low effort 
and/or for choosing team compensation while knowing that one’s own ability is 
low. Furthermore, the result could in part be driven by our choice of a team size of 
two. In larger teams, risk diversification possibilities are greater, and therefore, 
the diversification effect on the sorting decision should be stronger. Although this 
might lead us to reverse our conclusion regarding the strength of the effect, it does 
not affect our main result of finding evidence for both risk effects.    
Although common intuition and some of the literature suggest that team-based 
compensation induces individuals to reduce their effort, we find no such effect. 
Instead, there is strong evidence that low-productive workers tend to choose team-
based payment, whereas high-productive individuals prefer to be paid based on 
their own achievements. Thus, when self-selecting into team piece rates, the risk 
of being matched with a low-productive co-worker is real due to negative 
selection.  
Our sorting analysis also shows that, unlike most of the literature claims (e.g., 
Kocher et al., 2006; Königstein & Ruchala, 2007), not absolute productivity but 
one’s productivity in relation to the expected productivity of potential co-workers 
is decisive in the sorting decision. In the absence of a relative measure, absolute 
ability significantly predicts the sorting decision. However, once we add a relative 
measure of productivity, this measure becomes decisive. In line with intuition, this 
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implies that individuals’ decision to sort into a team depends crucially on their 
expectations about potential co-workers’ performance.  
 
Appendix 
Experimental Instructions 
 
General Instructions 
 
Thank you for participating in this economic decisions experiment. If you read the 
following instructions carefully, you can — depending on your decisions and 
those of the other players— earn further sums of money in addition to your 2.50 
Euros for showing up on time. 
During the experiment we will not speak of Euros, but of points. At the end of the 
experiment, the points will be converted into Euros at the following rate: 
10 Points = 1 Cent 
 
At the end of the experiment, the sums of money you will have earned given your 
decisions will be paid to you in cash.  
 
The experiment consists of 4 stages and a questionnaire. Every stage begins with 
a detailed explanation. The details will appear on the computer screen under the 
heading “Instructions.” Please read these instructions carefully. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you.  
 
In this experiment, we will ask you— among other things—to do additions. The 
exercises require mental arithmetic, which means that no mathematical aids, i.e., 
calculators, mobile phones, or calculations on scrap paper are allowed. If you 
disregard these rules, you will be excluded from the experiment, and you will 
receive no pay. 
  
During the experiment, you will not be allowed to communicate with other 
participants. Furthermore, we would like to point out that the computer is to be 
used only for the experiment. Communication between participants and 
unauthorized use of the computer will lead to exclusion from the experiment.  
 
Instructions for Stage 1 
 
In this part, it is your job to solve addition problems.  In the process you will add 
three two-digit numbers (for example: 23+43+10). Once you have found the 
answer, please enter it in the corresponding box and click the OK button with the 
mouse. You can earn money by answering the addition problems. For every 
correctly answered problem you receive 30 points. During a 5-minute period, you 
can answer as many problems as you like. 
Below you will see an example of an entry form. Directly under your addition 
problem, you will see the entry box for “your answer” and the OK button. If you 
enter the correct number and verify it with OK, you will receive 30 points, and the 
computer will immediately generate a new addition problem from random 
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numbers. If the number entered and verified with OK is incorrect, you will receive 
0 points for this problem, and likewise, a new addition problem will immediately 
be generated. At the end of the 5-minute period, you will be informed how many 
addition problems you answered correctly and how many points you earned. 
Please calculate the answer for the example problem below, enter the answer in 
the entry box, and click the OK button with the mouse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a reminder: For every addition problem that you answer correctly, you will 
receive 30 points. During the 5-minute period, you can answer as many questions 
as you like. In the upper right corner of the screen, the remaining time in seconds 
is shown. Please press Start as soon as you are ready to start with the addition 
problems. 
 
Screen for the 5-minute work phase 
 
 
 
Hint: Enter your answer and confirm your entry by clicking the OK button. The 
next problem will appear instantly. You receive 30 points for every addition 
problem that you answer correctly.  
 
Instructions for Stage 2  
 
In the next stage, you have 30 minutes to answer as many additions problem as 
you like. The remaining time is shown in the upper right corner of the screen. 
Again, in this stage, you can earn money. You will receive a fixed amount of 
4,050 points for this 30-minute stage. In addition, you will receive a certain 
number of points for every correctly answered addition problem. For this variable 
payment, you can choose among the following two alternatives. 
 
Alternative A: 
You will be randomly paired with another participant, who has also chosen this 
payment option. You will not find out who you have been paired with. Your 
earnings depend not only on the number of addition problems that you have 
answered correctly, but also on the number of addition problems that the other 
Add the values A, B, and C: 
 
Value A:  23 
Value B: 43 
Value C: 10 
 
Your answer: ____ 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
 
 
OK 
28 
 
participant has answered correctly. Likewise, the other participant’s result 
depends on your results. For every correctly solved problem, both participants 
will receive 15 points each, independent of who solved the problem correctly. If, 
for example, you solve one problem correctly and the other participant solves two 
problems correctly, then a total of three addition problems were answered 
correctly, and you will receive, just as the other participant, 3 x 15 points = 45 
points. If you solve zero problems correctly and the other participant solves 10 
problems correctly, you both receive 150 points each.  
 
Alternative B: 
In this pay alternative, only your own results determine how much you earn. For 
every correctly answered addition problem, you receive 30 points. If you, for 
example, solve three problems correctly, then you receive 3 x 30 points = 90 
points. If you answer zero problems correctly, you receive 0 points. 
 
Independent of the chosen pay alternative, you receive a fixed amount of 4,050 
points. This fixed amount will be paid to you independent of the number of 
correctly answered problems. 
 
Before you are credited the points for the number of correctly answered problems, 
a random draw will decide for every individual participant whether for this person 
10 correct addition problems are added to or deducted from the total. Both 
outcomes of the draw are equally likely. You will be paid based on the modified 
number of correctly answered problems and corresponding to your chosen pay 
alternative A or B. 
 
The following examples illustrate this for pay alternatives A and B: 
 
Example 1: Participant 1 solved 160 problems correctly; participant 2 solved 110 
problems correctly. The random draw results in participant 1 receiving 10 
additional correctly answered problems and deducting 10 correctly answered 
problems from participant 2. Correspondingly, participant 1 has 170 correctly 
answered problems and participant 2 has 100. 
 
 Alternative A: 
 Both participants receive 170 x 15 points + 100 x 15 points = 4,050 points. 
 
 Alternative B: 
Participant 1 receives 170 x 30 points = 5,100 points. Participant 2 
receives 100 x 30 = 3,000 points. 
 
Example 2: Participant 1 solved 90 problems correctly; participant 2 solved 150 
problems correctly. The random draw results in a deduction of 10 correctly 
answered problems from each participant. Correspondingly, participant 1 has 80 
correctly answered problems, and participant 2 has 140. 
 Alternative A: 
 Both participants receive 80 x 15 points + 140 x 15 points = 3,300 points. 
 
 Alternative B: 
Participant 1 receives 80 x 30 points = 2,400 points. Participant 2 receives 
140 x 30 points = 4,200 points. 
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Instructions for Stage 3  
 
Please note: 
The addition problems, which you are given in the next 30 minutes, are of the 
same type as the ones you previously answered. Again, you have to add three two-
digit numbers. The numbers are generated randomly. Consequently, the problems 
be answered differ neither in their level of difficulty nor in any other characteristic 
between pay alternatives A and B. Also note that you can choose your own work 
speed. You can work fast, slow, or not at all. You can also choose to keep yourself 
occupied with other activities. For example, in the 30-minute period, you can read 
a book, a journal, or newspaper that you brought, or you can listen to music on a 
MP3 player, or do anything else that you wish. However, you may not use a 
calculator or a cell phone, and you may use the computer only for the experiment. 
That means that you are not allowed to close the experimental program and 
cannot use the Internet or other applications. Furthermore, you may not 
communicate with other participants or leave the experimental laboratory. Apart 
from these restrictions, you can spend the 30 minutes however you like. 
 
Please make a decision: Which pay alternative do you choose? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 30-minute phase will begin shortly, in which you can earn additional money 
by solving addition problems. For this phase, you can choose between being 
compensated according to pay alternative A (you receive 15 points for every 
addition problem that you or your assigned, anonymous participant answers 
correctly) and pay alternative B (you receive 30 points for every addition problem 
that you correctly answer). Please use the 11-point scale below to indicate how 
strong your preference for your chosen pay alternative is. By choosing one of the 
two outer boxes, you indicate that you explicitly prefer pay alternative A or B. 
With the values in between, you can grade your choice. 
 
           
 
 
 
Instructions for Stage 4  
 
Please answer the following questions: 
How do you perceive the 30-minute work phase? 
Pay alternative A:  
You receive 15 points for every 
addition problem that you or your 
assigned, anonymous participant 
answers correctly. 
  
 
Pay alternative B: 
You receive 30 points for every 
addition problem that you answer 
correctly. 
 
Alternative A Alternative B 
I explicitly 
prefer 
alternative 
A 
I explicitly 
prefer 
alternative 
B 
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Situation is very 
risky regarding the 
number of 
registered questions 
        
Situation is not 
risky regarding the 
number of 
registered questions 
 
I have complete 
control over the 
outcome of the 
situation 
        
I have no control at 
all over the 
outcome of the 
situation 
 
Instructions for Stage 5  
 
What do you think: What percentage of participants will solve more 
questions correctly than you? 
Your payment is higher the closer your guess is to the exact percentage. If you 
guess the exact percentage, you receive 100 points. If your estimate is within 10 
percentage points above or below the correct number, you receive 50 points. If 
your estimate deviates by more than 10 percentage points, you receive 0 points in 
this stage. 
Please enter the percentage points as follows: For a probability of 64%, enter 
“64”. For a probability of 2%, enter “2”. Please enter only whole percentage 
points (no decimal places). 
What percentage of participants—according to you estimation—will solve more 
addition problems correctly than you? 
 
Your answer: ________ 
 
Instructions for Stage 6  
 
 Example screen for the work phase 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hint:  
You are working under pay alternative B. As a reminder: Pay alternative B 
implies that you receive 30 points for every addition problem that you correctly 
answer. 
Add the values A, B, and C: 
 
Value A: 68 
Value B: 99 
Value C: 14 
 
Your answer: ______ 
 
OK 
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Example screens for idiosyncratic risk 
 
Screen 1: 
You have chosen pay alternative B. 
You answered a total of 5 problems correctly. Therefore, you would receive 150 
points. Now a random draw will determine if 10 correctly answered problems will 
be added to or subtracted from your total. The random draw is visualized with the 
help of a “clock”. You will see this clock on the next screen. It is simply a circle 
split into four equally sized, colored parts. Two of the parts are white, and two 
parts are red. The clock also has one clock hand. This hand rotates clockwise until 
the computer stops the clock after a random period.  
If the hand stops in a white area, 10 correctly answered addition problems will be 
added to your total of correctly answered problems. If the hand stops in a red area, 
10 correctly answered addition problems will be subtracted. Because the areas are 
the same size, each result has the same probability. 
 
Screen 2: 
 
 
 
Random draw of the change in your correctly answered problems. 
Wait until the hand stops! 
 
Screen 3: 
The random draw that changes the number of your registered correctly answered 
problems stopped in a white area. That means that 10 correctly answered 
problems will be added to your total. 
 
Summary 
Number of your correctly answered addition problems: 5 
Change: 10 
Total number of registered addition problems: 15 
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